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Abstract 
The DoD spends approximately $200 billion annually to develop, acquire, and sustain 
weapon systems. It relies on regulations, statutes, and business processes to ensure these 
systems are delivered cost-effectively while meeting system performance and schedule 
requirements. The acquisition system has delivered superior weapon systems with leading 
edge capabilities, providing a military advantage, but has a less-than-impressive track record 
for cost-effectiveness and on-schedule performance. Several approaches have been 
proposed, discussed, and debated to improve defense acquisition. Incentives for the 
workforce are chief among them. This paper proposes a model for altering the compensation 
structure of the workforce, tying it to the cost, performance, and schedule achievement of the 
programs to which the workforce is assigned. The underlying premise is that introducing an 
economic incentive and thereby a sense of ownership in acquisition outcomes to the 
workforce sector setting is critical to achieving efficiencies. This paper examines current 
research on financial incentives and performance improvements at the individual and 
organizational level as a basis for a performance-based compensation model. 
Introduction 
The issues with defense acquisition programs have been documented and discussed 
for several decades now, perhaps since the emergence of the defense industry as the 
developer and supplier of weapon systems to the Department of Defense (DoD). The 
weapon systems have undoubtedly provided the U.S. Armed Forces with an overwhelming 
advantage in force projection and application, but the question remains on the ability of the 
defense acquisition system to provide these capabilities cost-effectively and on schedule. 
Several recommendations have been made to improve the system, and many have 
suggested additional incentives for the acquisition workforce as a part of the solution. 
However, a specific proposal on what an incentive scheme should look like is missing. This 
paper addresses this gap with a proposed model for financial incentives tied to the long-term 
success of programs and underpins the model with research on financial incentives and 
their impact on individual and organization performance. The potential benefits along with 
the unintended consequences are also discussed. 
Research Plan 
This paper recaps the traditional issues associated with weapon system acquisition 
and follows with additional insights from experts in defense acquisition on addressing these 
issues.  
Academic research on financial incentives and the impact on individual and 
organization performance are reviewed next to form the basis for a new approach to 
workforce compensation. 
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I then discuss a proposed incentive scheme for workforce compensation with 
financial incentives tied to long-term performance of weapon systems measured in terms of 
cost, schedule, technical performance, and sustainment metrics established for the system.  
The paper then addresses the potential benefits and consequences of the incentive 
scheme and concludes with recommendations on additional topics that should be studied to 
validate the proposed incentive scheme. 
Acquisition System Performance 
In Defense Acquisition Reform, 1969–2009: An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald Fox (2011) 
cites Harvard University studies from 1962 that reviewed 12 major weapons programs from 
the 1950s and concluded “that development costs were generally significantly higher than 
originally estimated. Production costs also tended to exceed original estimates by significant 
margins. These systems also experienced schedule delays, which averaged 36 percent 
beyond the projected time for completion.” He added, “In the 1960s, cost increases 
continued to occur on major systems. No systems were found that had been completed at 
the cost projected, and none was found to have cost less than predicted.”  
The Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 2014, Annual Report released 
by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2014) is a data-driven analysis of the acquisition system performance for 
2014. The report shows that from 1992 to 2014, 16 programs had development contract 
cost growth of at least 200%, and 18 programs exhibited more than 100% cost growth in 
early production contract cost. The production contract cost growth does not differentiate 
between cost growth due to additional quantities and changes in unit prices. The 
development contract cost growth does not identify the growth due to contract scope 
changes as opposed to growth in cost of the original scope of the contract. Technical 
performance is measured along two dimensions. One is operational effectiveness, which is 
“a measure of the overall ability of a system to accomplish a mission when used by 
representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational 
employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics, supportability, 
survivability, vulnerability, and threat” (OUSD[AT&L], 2014). A second measure of technical 
performance is operational suitability—“a composite evaluation that considers a system's 
safety, interoperability, availability, maintainability, and reliability” (OUSD[AT&L], 2014). The 
report showed that, excluding satellites, the operational effectiveness was between 80% and 
90% for all programs, and operational suitability for 123 programs was below 65%, and for 
65 programs was at 80%. Weapon systems pushing the technology envelope and reaching 
90% effectiveness demonstrate good technical performance. However, operational 
effectiveness at 60% suggests that sustainment costs over the operational life of the 
systems will be higher. The technical performance metrics taken in conjunction with 
development contract cost increases and early production cost increases suggest that 
additional avenues must be explored to improve the performance of the acquisition system. 
The two reports suggest that while significant efforts have been made to improve the 
system from the 1960s to the present day, cost, technical, and schedule problems, as 
reflected in the performance of the system, persist. This then warrants exploring innovative 
approaches to address these issues with a focus on human capital and financial incentives 
to simulate private sector behavior. The paper explores these solutions in the ensuing 
sections.  
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Acquisition System Improvement—Workforce 
Over the years, several approaches have been discussed to reform the acquisition 
system to produce better outcomes. The Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 
Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight published its findings in July 2009 
(Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law & Oversight, 2009). Key recommendations related 
to the acquisition workforce included the following:  
 Assign to the Service Chiefs responsibility for establishing, managing and 
maintaining a highly competent acquisition workforce, including education, 
training, career path development and succession planning—the latter is 
rarely done today in any institutional fashion. Appropriate staffing standards 
should be created for all critical positions. (Task Force on Defense 
Acquisition Law & Oversight, 2009) 
 Streamline the hiring and rewarding of key acquisition personnel, including 
providing appropriate compensation and other forms of incentives. Authority 
to quickly employ qualified individuals as well as to dismiss individuals who 
are not performing in their assigned responsibilities should be vested in the 
Secretary of Defense. (Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law & Oversight, 
2009) 
The task force also stated that 
today the government too often finds itself with minimally experienced and 
transient individuals leading major acquisition programs, able to attract new 
people only after long delays, unable to couple rewards to performance, and 
with many senior positions simply unoccupied. Talented and dedicated 
people can often overcome a poor organizational structure, but a good 
organizational structure cannot overcome inadequate performance. When 
qualified people are combined with sound organizations and practices, 
success is virtually assured. The acquisition process, unlike most government 
pursuits, is a business function. It demands skills and talents that are far 
more common to the business world than to government and military 
operations. (Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law & Oversight, 2009) 
The most recent compendium of views on acquisition reform was published by the 
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2014). Thirty experts provided 
their views on ways to reform the system. Several themes emerged from the experts, and 
two in particular have specific relevance to this paper: 
 “Nearly half of the experts feel that cultural change is required while over two-
thirds believe improving incentives for the acquisition workforce is necessary 
for reform” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2014). 
 “Two-thirds of the contributors feel that training and recruiting of the 
acquisition workforce must be improved” (Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2014). 
The 2009 task force report and the 2014 Senate study are focused on workforce 
issues as central to improving the defense acquisition system. 
The Department of Defense 2014 Study of Program Manager Training and 
Experience (2014) goes even further, suggesting,  
The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries should implement 
clearer, more tangible recognition, incentives, and enhanced promotion 
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opportunities for outstanding program management. Cost performance on 
major acquisition programs should be considered as a major weighting factor 
for this recognition. The continued absence of relevant rewards belies 
government statements of dedication to achieving significant cost reductions 
on defense acquisition programs. The cost savings achieved in implementing 
this recommendation can far outweigh any implementation cost to the 
Defense Department and the taxpayer.  
In Defense Acquisition Reform, 1969–2009: An Elusive Goal, Fox (2011) had similar 
findings:  
A personnel board, comprising senior military and civilian acquisition officials, 
should review applicants for all major positions and be authorized and 
motivated to remove government personnel whose performance is marginal 
or inadequate. The board should also have the authority to provide significant 
financial rewards for outstanding performance. If, as has been the case for 
five decades, the military promotion system will not respond to repeated 
attempts to provide attractive promotions and career opportunities for 
acquisition managers to attain flag or civilian equivalent grade, then the 
Defense Department should provide other incentives, such as additional pay 
and incentive compensation. If an extra $30,000 or more per year were paid 
to selected military officers and civilians (at the rank of O–6 and above) and 
career regulations permitted them to remain in the acquisition field, incentives 
to retire and join the defense industry would be minimized. The extra cost 
would be negligible compared to the benefits of retaining experienced 
acquisition managers. Such a proposal is not without precedent. Military 
officers on flight status and submarine duty as well as medical and dental 
officers and other special-skilled officers currently receive additional pay. 
Indeed, Sweden’s government acquisition agency addresses the problem of 
attracting and retaining senior people—military and civilian—by a special law 
that allows an added salary increase for crucial acquisition positions. Thus, a 
Swedish colonel serving as a program manager can receive a significantly 
higher salary than other colonels and even the director general of the agency. 
This incentive provides prestige and draws highly qualified, experienced 
people to senior acquisition positions. 
Nathaniel H. Sledge, in “Pentagon Procurement Reforms Face Slim Chances of 
Success” (2012), argues that  
to ensure compliance, there must be positive incentives over punitive 
measures. Employing the carrot more often than the stick will make the 
establishment of an enduring and sustainable culture of efficiency more likely. 
Incentives must be aligned with performance to increase their credibility and 
reinforce the appropriate behaviors. Efficient program managers should 
benefit from “benign” oversight, while inefficient programs should get “help” 
but not sanctions; that is, unless the program is a candidate for restructuring. 
All of the above suggests that, in the collective assessment of defense acquisition 
experts, solutions must focus on the workforce and financial incentives in particular. Any 
reform efforts must include targeted actions that systemically address workforce “ownership” 
of the business outcomes of the acquisition process. 
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Incentives and Individual and Organization Performance Improvement 
Steven J. Condly, Richard E. Clark, and Harold D. Stolovitch (2003) completed a 
meta-analytic review of 45 studies on the effects of incentives on workplace performance 
and documented the impact of several factors that influenced performance increases. This 
study is particularly relevant because the studies included in the meta-analysis required a 
baseline measurement prior to the introduction of incentives to measure improvements after 
the introduction of incentives. Additionally, the meta-analytic approach summarizes the 
results of many studies across several factors. These include location or type of 
organization (business or government), length of the incentive program, type of incentive 
(money or social recognition), competition (incentives to only the highest performers versus 
everyone that reaches a preset level), type of work (mental or physical), type of study 
(simulation, experiment, field setting), and type of performance motivated choice, which can 
be working toward new or established goals, showing persistence, or working smarter in 
either area.  
They found that team-based incentives provided greater gains to the tune of 48% 
improvement in performance when compared to a gain of 19% for incentives tied to 
individual contributions. Monetary incentives resulted in a 27% gain when compared to non-
monetary incentives, which resulted in a 13% gain. Programs with only top performers 
receiving incentives versus programs where everyone had an opportunity to earn an 
incentive showed no statistical difference, but resulted in an average gain of 22%. Incentives 
that were in effect for over six months resulted in a 44% improvement in performance 
compared to 29% for programs between one and six months and 20% for programs lasting 
less than a month. 
These results provide a basis for considering team-based monetary incentives in 
compensating the acquisition workforce. 
Mark Huselid (1995), in his paper, “The Impact of Human Resource Management 
Practices on Turnover, Productivity, and Corporate Financial Performances,” 
comprehensively evaluated the links between High Performance Work 
Practices and firm performance. Results based on a national sample of 
nearly one thousand firms indicate that these practices have an economically 
and statistically significant impact on both intermediate employee outcomes 
(turnover and productivity) and short- and long-term measures of corporate 
financial performance. 
Huselid further goes on to include in high performance work practices 
comprehensive recruitment and selection procedures, incentive compensation and 
performance management systems, and extensive employee training and involvement. The 
acquisition workforce may not represent the sample used by Huselid (1995) in his study, but 
the relationship established by his study should apply on an empirical basis to the 
workforce, thus building the case for the use of high performance work practices in the 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization, including the use of incentive 
compensation.  
Alfie Kohn in “Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work” in the Harvard Business Review ( 
1993) presents several reasons on why no reward system can match intrinsic motivation as 
a driver of individual performance. Kohn suggests that rewards and punishments are two 
sides of the same coin attempting to manipulate behavior; he also suggests that using 
rewards to improve performance while ignoring underlying organizational issues impacting 
performance is not likely to result in lasting change. Kohn (1993) proposes that rewards 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 294 - 
introduce temporary behavior changes that disappear when the rewards are eliminated and 
also states that 
whenever people are encouraged to think about what they will get for 
engaging in a task, they become less inclined to take risks or explore 
possibilities, to play hunches or to consider incidental stimuli. In a word, the 
number one casualty of rewards is creativity. 
Daniel H. Pink, in summarizing his book Drive—The Surprising Truth About What 
Motivates Us, states “Carrots & sticks are so last century. Drive says for 21st century work, 
we need to upgrade to autonomy, mastery, purpose.” The argument is similar to Kohn’s in 
that intrinsic motivation with control over work, ability to master and develop one’s expertise, 
and having a higher purpose to work other than profit is what drives productivity in creative 
work. He suggests that rewards-based compensation may benefit routine, monotonous work 
efforts where intrinsic motivation is low. 
The counter to Kohn and Pink’s conclusions is presented by Gerald E. Ledford and 
Barry Gerhart (2013) in “Negative Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation: More 
Smoke Than Fire.” The authors have catalogued theories on motivation and research on the 
effects of rewards on motivation and performance and conclude 
that rewards clearly tend to increase performance because they increase 
total motivation (extrinsic plus intrinsic). Detrimental effects of extrinsic 
rewards are not inevitable, and appropriate use of rewards can increase 
intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivation. Negative effects on motivation can be 
averted systematically by clearly understanding and avoiding the conditions 
that could create a negative effect. (Ledford & Gerhart, 2013)  
They further add,  
Perhaps the most important lesson from the research is that the effects of the 
reward depend on the social context in which it is provided. If the reward is 
appropriately implemented, it should enhance, rather than undermine, 
intrinsic motivation—making the incentive effect that much more powerful 
than if it relies on extrinsic motivation alone. This requires appropriate 
communication about the importance of the task and the nature of the 
incentive; specific, meaningful performance goals; appropriate feedback and 
support from supervisors; selection systems that help sort out those who do 
not fit the desired culture (and reward strategy) of the organization; and an 
organizational culture in which incentives are supported by managers and 
employees. This discussion serves as a reminder that contextual factors are 
at least as important to success or failure of reward programs as the technical 
merits of the programs. (Ledford & Gerhart, 2013) 
The implications of the research are significant for the defense acquisition enterprise 
where the requirements and conditions, as follows, for enhanced intrinsic motivation have 
been established: 
 A motivated workforce that is fairly compensated in base salary and benefits 
 A workforce engaged in a high purpose mission charged with developing and 
delivering sophisticated tools for the defense of the nation and protection of 
the troops 
 A highly supportive work environment that encourages innovation and skill 
development with training and ample opportunity for creative work 
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When the above conditions are combined with a properly structured rewards system, 
superior results can be expected. 
The next section describes an approach that leverages the acquisition work 
environment to propose a system of rewards that can deliver these results. 
Proposed Approach  
The paper assumes that every acquisition workforce employee is associated with a 
program that is in the pre-systems acquisition, systems acquisition, or sustainment phase in 
its lifecycle. While industry uses stock grants or stock options that vest over time to tie 
incentives to long-term gains of the organization, this concept can be captured by the term 
Program Credits (PCs). Every program has PCs allocated to it based on Affordability Caps 
established for the program, and these PCs are available for distribution to the workforce. 
Employees receive program credits based on an appraisal of the program and its 
performance relative to cost, schedule, technical performance, meeting affordability targets, 
and should-cost objectives, or other relevant measures of program success measured at 
program milestones or annually depending on the phase the program is in. Each program 
credit has a dollar value associated with it, and the credits vest in an employee’s account 
over a period of time ranging from four to 10 years at a variable rate, with 40–45% vesting in 
the employee’s account by the end of the Production and Deployment phase and 55–60% 
vesting over the operations and maintenance phase. No vesting occurs until the program 
reaches the beginning of the sustainment phase. Rapid acquisition programs or smaller 
increments may reach sustainment in 4–5 years, while larger programs may reach 
sustainment in more than five years though the acquisition system has a goal of reaching 
the production and deployment phase in five years from program initiation.  
The longer an individual is associated with a program, the greater his or her 
contribution to the success of the program and, therefore, the greater his or her benefit. This 
approach also enables the DoD to skew vesting toward meeting performance and cost 
objectives during the operations and maintenance phases of a program. The acquisition 
workforce has a greater incentive to focus on and optimize the system design for lower 
sustainment costs during the earlier phases and continue to work on the program through 
the sustainment phase to ensure cost targets are achieved and realize the personal financial 
benefits of its contributions and dedication. The defense acquisition system relies on the 
defense industry contractors to design and produce systems. The defense acquisition 
workforce provides oversight and insight on the contractors’ efforts, but now with a sharper 
focus on meeting program objectives.  
This approach also allows negative credits to be assessed to an employee’s program 
credit balance when a program does not meet its targets in later phases after meeting 
targets in earlier phases. As an example, an employee accumulates 50,000 program credits 
during the Technology Development and Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
phases as a result of exceeding program objectives. However, during sustainment if the 
program does not meet critical materiel readiness objectives, negative credits would be 
assigned to all employees that were associated with the program whether or not they are on 
the program during the sustainment phase. This is intended to drive the workforce that is on 
the program during the earlier phases to focus on the longer term sustainability and lifecycle 
costs of the program for its own benefit and the DoD’s benefit.  
Over an individual’s career, based on all the programs that person has worked on, 
the individual’s vested credits can be substantial if the programs have met all of their 
objectives. The incentive for the individual is to ensure the success of all the programs he or 
she has worked on. If this incentive extends to the entire acquisition workforce, we could 
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see significant benefits and efficiencies across the entire system. The vested credits 
become available to the employees when they retire or leave government service. 
Critical Factors 
The PCs an employee accumulates over time have to be significant for the employee 
to demonstrate ownership of programs they participate in during their career to deliver 
superior results. 
The allocation of credits has to be impartial, fair, and commensurate with an 
employee’s contributions. Allocations can vary across employees just as in industry, stock 
option allocations vary across employees based on their responsibilities. 
All employees associated with a program must be eligible for PCs. 
Implementation 
Funds must be appropriated by Congress and managed by the DoD. PCs must be 
assigned to a program based on the affordability and total lifecycle cost of the system. PCs 
must be allocated to the workforce and vested based on an approved scheme. 
 A hypothetical example of how such a system can be implemented and 
administered follows. A program is currently in a Technology Development (TD) Phase, and 
an Affordability target of $5 billion has been established for the program: 
 Affordability Target (LCC): $5000 million 
 Total PCs to be allocated to the program workforce over the life of the 
program: $50 million (1% of Affordability Target) 
 Program Credit Estimation Scheme 
 
Note. Refer to Fox (2011, pp. 21–27) for a definition of the phases; the TMRR phase replaced the Technology 
Development phase referenced in the DoD 5000.02 (2008) Instruction. 
TMRR—Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction 
EMD—Engineering and Manufacturing 
P&D—Production and Deployment 
O&M—Operations and Maintenance 
Interpreting the Table 
 The program credits per employee are an average and should be based on 
the relative contribution and importance of the employee to the program’s 
success. The credits for the employee can vary.  
 These credits are allocated to the employee, but vesting may not begin until 
year seven once the program enters the operation and sustainment phase 
after a full year of production. 
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The following tables show how during the program life, credits will be allocated and 
then vested and available for the employee. 
Scenario 1 
An employee stays with the program and the program meets all the objectives during 
all the phases (see Table 2). 
 Scenario 1 Program Credit Allocation 
 
 Scenario 1 Program Credit Vested and Available Upon Retirement or 
Leaving Government 
 
As Table 3 indicates, assuming a program meets all its objectives during the TD, 
EMD, P&D, and O&M phases and an employee has been with the program throughout this 
effort, he or she can be vested in a significant number of program credits and will be able to 
realize them upon retirement or leaving government service.  
Scenario 2 
An employee stays with the program and the program meets the objectives during 
the TD and EMD phases but does not meet the objectives during the O&M Phase (see 
Table 4). 
 Scenario 2 Program Credit Allocation 
 
Note. Cumulative Program credits allocated is less when sustainment objectives are not met.  
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12
Program 
Credits 




Allocated 16,000$  32,000$  42,000$  52,000$  62,000$  69,100$  82,300$  95,500$  108,700$  114,800$  120,900$  127,000$ 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12




‐$         ‐$         ‐$            ‐$            ‐$            ‐$           
Available If Employee 
Retires/Leaves Govt 
Service  ‐$         ‐$         ‐$         ‐$         ‐$         ‐$         16,000$  32,000$  42,000$     52,000$     62,000$     69,100$    
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12
Program Credits 
Allocated  16,000$  16,000$  10,000$    10,000$  10,000$  7,100$     7,100$     7,100$     7,100$       6,100$       6,100$       6,100$      
Cumulative Program 
Credits Allocated 16,000$  32,000$  42,000$    52,000$  62,000$  69,100$  76,200$  83,300$  90,400$     96,500$     102,600$  108,700$ 
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 Scenario 2 Program Credit Vested and Available Upon Retirement or 
Leaving Government 
 
 Dollars Available to Employee in Scenarios 1 and 2 
 
The model in Table 6 attempts to show a difference between the dollars available to 
the employee in Scenario 1 versus Scenario 2.  
This is a notional model; several factors can be adjusted to determine the payout 
available to the employee. The credits allocated to the earlier phases will be important to 
ensure good supportability is designed into the system to reduce lifecycle costs. The 
validation of the system performance occurs when the system is deployed, and therefore the 
reduction in credits for the system not meeting operational effectiveness and suitability can 
be made more severe. The value per credit can be adjusted based on the program phase 
and the type of program. For example, the first increment can be assigned higher values if it 
results in a base platform with later increments being allocated lower values since they are 
likely smaller programs. The model offers several levers that can be adjusted based on 
observed performance. 
Necessary Conditions for the Program Credit Approach 
For the program credit scheme to be considered for implementation, the necessary 
conditions are outlined below. These conditions will not be sufficient, as a detailed 
implementation plan will require several additional factors to be considered:  
 Measurement metrics for the program need to be established using the 
Acquisition Program Baseline, which captures the program manager and thus 
the team commitment to cost, schedule, and performance goals. 
 Post-deployment measures of mission completion rates or other performance 
measures used to assess system effectiveness and suitability can be used as 
a measure of performance in the Operations and Sustainment phase. 
 A determination of changes in metrics due to factors beyond the program 
management office control, such as threat changes, unit cost changes due to 
quantity differences, and Nunn-McCurdy breaches must be assessed. 
 An independent body akin to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must be established or 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12




(6,100)$   (6,100)$   (6,100)$      ‐$            ‐$            ‐$           
Available If Employee 
Retires/Leaves Govt 
Service  ‐$         ‐$         ‐$           ‐$         ‐$         ‐$         9,900$     19,800$  23,700$     33,700$     43,700$     50,800$    
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leveraged to assess the performance against the goals to determine and 
assign program credits.  
 A definition of the acquisition workforce and a fair assessment of the 
workforce that would be eligible for program credits need to be made. 
 A fair process to allocate program credits to team members that is tied to goal 
achievement by the team and the individual’s contribution must be 
established. 
 Legislative action to establish funding for program credits and authority to 
execute a program credit scheme will be required. 
 An enhanced personnel information system to track program credits from 
allocation to vesting will need to be implemented.  
There is precedent in the current process for meeting some of the necessary 
conditions. For example, including Operations and Support costs in program baselines has 
been a challenge since these costs are not appropriated by program. However, 
Performance Based Logistics agreements measure performance outcomes, and these 
measures along with readiness measures can be used to determine program credits in the 
Operations and Support phase. Acquisition Program Baselines can be used to determine 
goals the program teams need to achieve.  
Potential Benefits and Unintended Consequences 
This long-term rewards approach will reduce the compensation differential between 
working for private industry and working for the DoD while supporting a high value mission 
for the nation. Program offices will be able to attract the best and brightest from both within 
and outside the government, increasing the pool of talent to choose from. Greater numbers 
of military officers, who rotate into and out of acquisition positions, may now want to make a 
career in acquisition (legislative changes will be required to permit this choice). The 
relatively higher compensation for the acquisition workforce within acquisition may result in 
morale problems for the workforce in non-acquisition jobs across the DoD. There is, 
however, precedent for agencies within the federal government to support higher 
compensation for highly qualified individual as in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
for highly specialized scientists. Individuals and teams will look for the most cost effective 
ideas to meet both current targets and reduce long-term sustainment costs. The workforce 
will be motivated to champion innovations from the technology industry and support faster 
integration into weapon systems. Solutions from international partners will be evaluated for a 
faster time to market. This change is expected to be driven not only by the external rewards 
instituted, but also the recognition of the value of these efforts in instituting such a system of 
rewards. The increased recognition of the acquisition work effort by this scheme should also 
prompt functional areas like contracting to exhibit desired behaviors to a greater degree, 
such as more committed negotiations and seeking best value for taxpayer dollars. 
Potential unintended consequences include program teams becoming advocates for 
programs instead of impartial executors of programs. Additional negative impacts could 
include program data manipulation to skew performance results for increased rewards. 
These consequences will need to be addressed via checks and balances in the system 
much as they exist in the current business processes. The proposed approach will require 
the development of a complex information system to administer and audit the Program 
Credit scheme, but the benefit may be a comprehensive view of program performance data 
to address other systemic problems along with improvements in program execution. 
A systemic change will result in consequences, and the positive and negative 
impacts will need to be monitored to adjust the system.  
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Conclusions 
Improvements in defense acquisition cannot be realized without the engaged 
participation of the acquisition workforce. Defense enterprise experts have articulated that 
workforce incentives have to be a key component of improvement initiatives. While the role 
of incentives in enhancing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is debated in academic circles, 
there is evidence that a well-constructed incentive scheme combined with robust human 
resource management practices can improve individual and organization performance. 
Acquisition offers additional advantages of being a high purpose work environment with 
opportunities to innovate that can further enhance intrinsic motivation.  
The paper proposes a notional approach for incentives that are tied to the 
achievement of cost, performance, and schedule goals including long-term sustainment 
goals. Additional research is needed to validate the factors that would enhance intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations of the workforce. Research is also suggested for understanding and 
measuring individual contributions in a team setting, which is the organization model for 
many programs. Additional items for further investigation include the necessary conditions 
required to implement the model, including the legislative changes required. 
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